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Abstract 
 
Should Russia escalate the Ukraine crisis, or threaten other states in post-Soviet 
space, the EU will need to be able to apply hard-hitting sanctions against Russian 
energy exports. However, the divergent dependence of European states on Russian 
gas imports will make it very difficult to achieve consensus on such sanctions. This 
article analyses the recent measures that the EU Commission has initiated to help 
reduce the dependence of European states on Russian gas. It explores the scope of EU 
competence to reduce Member-State dependence on Russian gas in three key areas: 
promoting the use of renewable and energy efficiency; completing the internal energy 
market and strengthening the EU’s position vis-à-vis external gas suppliers. The 
article’s conclusions examine the political factors which will hinder or enable the EU 
to promote greater gas supply security and highlight the importance of political 
communication in enhancing EU legal competence in energy security. 
 
Introduction 
 
This article examines the measures that the EU can take to enhance security of its gas 
supply and thereby enhance its ability to apply effective sanctions against Russia.1 It 
focuses, in particular, on the intersection between the legal and political dimensions 
of energy security. An analysis of the interaction between EU law and the political 
drivers of EU energy policy is essential in understanding the state of play in European 
energy security. The 2014 Energy Security Strategy and 2015 Energy Union indicate 
                                                 
1
 Energy security has two key dimensions: security of supply and acceptable cost. See G. Bahgat, 
“Europe’s energy security: challenges and opportunities” (2006) 82 (5) International Affairs 965. 
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that the European Commission is increasingly determined to use competition law and 
antitrust legislation to restrict the leverage of Gazprom on the European gas market. 
The Ukraine-Russia crisis has also led the Commission to be more willing to push 
ahead with the internal energy market by enforcing competition law and by ensuring 
binding EU energy efficiency and renewables targets are met. At the same time, many 
European states are resistant to these efforts by the Commission due to a variety of 
short-term economic and political incentives, including the desire to protect national 
energy industries and jobs and to ensure low energy prices over the short-term. The 
formal competence of the EU Commission in energy policy will, therefore, be a key 
determinant of the EU’s ability to promote the implementation of the important 
measures contained in the Energy Security Strategy and the Energy Union, especially 
the completion of the internal energy market and strengthening the EU’s position vis-
à-vis external energy suppliers.  
 
The article begins by undertaking an overview of EU competence in the field of 
energy. It then highlights the urgency of tackling energy insecurity in the EU by 
exploring the implications of European states’ dependence on Russian gas for the 
EU’s ability to tackle Russian revisionism. The article proceeds by analysing the 
measures which the EU has proposed to enhance Europe’s security of gas supply 
since the onset of the Ukraine-Russia crisis: the Energy Security Strategy and the 
Energy Union. It highlights that while progress has been made in areas such as gas 
infrastructure, other areas, such as diversifying gas supplies, creating an internal EU 
energy market and fostering a stronger level of European energy efficiency and self-
sufficiency are taking longer to implement.  
 
The article then considers the legal competence of the EU in three key areas which 
will be central to European energy security: promoting the use of renewables and 
enhancing energy efficiency; completing the internal energy market and strengthening 
the EU’s position vis-à-vis external gas suppliers. The article concludes by reflecting 
on the factors which will facilitate the Commission to help foster greater security of 
energy supply in Europe, with a particular focus on the role of political 
communication. 
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An overview of EU's legal competence in the field of energy 
 
The EU's competence on energy  
 
One experiences a certain degree of de-ja-vu in current EU deliberations about a 
single energy market. This is because energy monopolised Europe’s early integration 
agenda manifested in the establishment of the so-called European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the EURATOM in 1957. The ECSC Treaty is 
symbolic of the early stage of European integration, where Member States undertook 
the task of pooling their coal and steel resources together and lifting restrictions on 
imports and exports, thereby creating a single coal and steel market.  
 
Similarly, under EURATOM, the European Commission obtained the status of a 
supranational regulatory authority in three areas: radiation protection, supply of 
nuclear fissile materials and nuclear safeguards. Since the Treaty made no reference 
to fixed criteria as regards the standardisation of design, operation and maintenance of 
nuclear installations, regulatory activities in the sphere of nuclear energy evolved by 
means of the national authorities and to a lesser degree by International Organisations 
and Agencies.2 The co-existence of European, international and national actors as 
well as the potential legislative bases to the energy sector inherent in EURATOM 
(Articles 31, 32 Euratom) and the former EC Treaty (Articles 95, 152 and 175(1) EC) 
posed questions as to the most appropriate legislator in the area of nuclear law.  
 
The above competence conundrum remained unresolved for years to come. For 
instance, at the time of the UK’s accession to what was then the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973, the Treaty maintained no express legal basis that would 
enable the EU to adopt energy measures. Instead, a range of general provisions based 
on substantive law (such as the four freedoms) of the EEC Treaty provided the legal 
                                                 
2
 The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994 by a diplomatic conference convened by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. It was ratified by all Member States and entered into force in 
1996. 
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basis for legislation in the field of energy. These included specific powers under the 
Treaty that enabled the EU legislature to regulate the Single Market or general powers 
to pursue the then Community's objectives. While the EU could therefore act 
peripherally touching upon areas connected to energy in order to liberalise the 
European energy market, the lack of an express provision in the field confirmed that 
energy as a policy area remained in the sovereign reserve of the Member States. 
When it came to energy security, for instance, the majority of the Member States 
favoured the conclusion of a multilateral treaty which took the form of the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) that came into force in 1998. The ECT was signed by fifty-two 
states, the EU and Euratom and provided a legal framework for international energy 
cooperation. It set a commonly accepted foundation observed by the participating 
governments, thus ‘minimising the risks associated with energy-related investments 
and trade.’3 Russia accepted provisional application of the ECT – it initially signed 
the ECT but officially refused to ratify it and proposed a new energy charter in 2009.4 
 
While the ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002, the Euratom Treaty stayed in force 
maintaining the same aim of developing EU nuclear industry. It still remains an 
independent settlement and has not been reformed by an Intergovernmental 
Conference. This confirms the EU’s unsettled legal jurisdiction in the area of nuclear 
safety but, as mentioned above, did not necessarily suggest the lack of legal bases in 
the former EC Treaty with an indirect relevance to nuclear sector standards. For 
instance, although the EC Treaty did not include a specific Title on Energy that would 
enable it to promote internal energy market liberalisation, there were still avenues for 
the EU legislature to push legislation carrying such an impact.  
 
For instance, former Article 95 EC (the current Article 114 TFEU internal market 
legal basis) was available and could be employed to protect the consumer, once 
                                                 
3
 The ECT is available at http://www.ena.lt/pdfai/Treaty.pdf  [Accessed October 19, 2015]. See for an 
analysis of the ECT: P.D. Cameron, “The EU and Energy Security: a Critical Review of the Legal 
Issues” in A. Antoniadis et al, The European Union and Global Emergencies: A Law and Policy 
Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). pp.127 onwards. 
4
  See for a brief summary: P. Roche and S. Petit, “Russia’s withdrawal from the Energy Charter 
Treaty’ Norton Rose Fullbright Publications, August 2009, available at 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/22691/russias-withdrawal-from-the-
energy-charter-treaty [Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
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existing disparities in national product safety rules (e.g. the treatment of foodstuffs by 
ionising radiation) hindering the functioning of the internal market (e.g. the free 
movement of foodstuffs) created conditions of unequal competition.5  In the same 
vein, energy security legislation emerged in the form of secondary legislation, such as 
Directive 2001/776 on renewables, Directive 2003/307 on biofuels (both repealed by 
Renewable Energy Directive 2009/288 and Directive 2004/67 concerning measures to 
safeguard security of natural gas supply (later replaced by Regulation 994/2010).9 It 
was adopted in 2004 with a view to foster an internal gas market between the Member 
States and provided for reporting obligations for national governments. Almost at the 
same time, a regional treaty between EU Member States and eight countries of South-
East Europe was agreed in 2005 in order to create a regional gas market – the Energy 
Community (of South East Europe). 
 
Four years later, the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, resolved the 
EU’s legal jurisdiction in the field of energy. It provided for the first time a Title in 
the Treaty proper in the field of energy. Article 194 TFEU creates a new competence 
for the EU legislature with the aim to ensure that Member States can diversify their 
energy supplies and improve competitiveness: 
 
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the 
environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of 
new and renewable forms of energy; and 
                                                 
5
 See European Parliament v. Council  (Chernobyl) (C-70/88) [1990] E.C.R. 1-2041. Treaty legal 
bases on Environment, Transport and Common Commercial Policy also provided opportunity for 
energy-related measures. 
6
 [2001] O.J.L. 283/33. 
7
 [2003] O.J.L. 123/42. 
8
 [2009] O.J.L. 140/16. 
9
 [2004] O.J.L. 127/92. Regulation 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas and 
repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC [2010] O.J.L. 295/1. 
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(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
 
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, 
the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to 
achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted 
after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. 
 
Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without 
prejudice to Article 192(2)(c). 
 
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in 
accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall unanimously and 
after consulting the European Parliament, establish the measures referred 
to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature. 
 
Indeed, Article 194 TFEU provides the EU and its Member States with a shared 
competence. As it is traditionally the case with all areas of shared competence, the 
Member States are pre-empted by the EU legislative Institutions’ exercise of power. 
Having said that, EU competence in the field of energy is not unconstrained. There is 
an express caveat in the use of the EU’s new energy competence. Article 194 (2) 
TFEU, reduces the pre-emptive effect of EU legislation in the field by confirming that 
that the adoption of measures which: ‘affect a Member State’s right to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply’ is prohibited.  
 
Consequently, such measures can only be adopted on the basis of other, non-energy 
specific provisions, such as by unanimous decision of the Council in accordance with 
Article 192(2)(c) TFEU viz. Environment measures significantly affecting a Member 
State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply. Hence, the bottom line is that whilst the EU possesses the constitutional and 
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institutional ammunition to act collectively on behalf of its Member States in the field 
of energy it does not have such competence in all fields of policy.  
The above argument is crucial especially when it comes to energy security, one of the 
key aims of EU energy policy according to Article 194 (1) (b) TFEU). Energy 
security is commonly meant to entail, at least from a 'Brussels perspective', the EU's 
capacity to secure access to energy supplies in order to correspond to the energy 
needs of its Member States.10 In this context, energy becomes a strategic resource 
and, as such, internal energy market liberalisation falls short of addressing European 
energy security concerns, including security of supply. This is because there are 
developments beyond the international energy sector that transcend the economic 
terrain and pose numerous geopolitical challenges to the EU. For instance, there is 
little doubt that dependence on oil imports from rogue states constitutes a threat to EU 
security. The same applies to the dependence of a number of Member States on 
Russian gas.  
 
In light of such threats, the externalisation or 'securitisation' of the EU’s internal 
energy market has become a necessity in order to ensure pan-European (and by 
extension global) energy security. Indeed it would not be a fallacy to conceive the EU 
as a market power on the world stage with full capacity to externalise its (internal) 
market policies and regulations in a multilateral context.11 Energy security provides a 
fertile ground where the EU can project itself as a (market-based) normative power 
outside the contours of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, therefore, 
externalise its constitutive market values. In contrast to the relatively limited ability of 
the EU to exert external influence through CFSP,12 the EU possesses considerable 
power-tools to force its modus operandi externally due to its status as a large and 
established energy market. This occurs, for instance, via a combination of 
liberalisation of the energy market and the use of coercion against both Member 
                                                 
10
 See R. Leal-Arcas and A Filis, “Conceptualizing EU Energy Security Through an EU Constitutional 
Law Perspective” (2013) 36 Fordham International l Law Journal 1225; P. Aalto and D. Korkmaz 
Temel “European Energy Security: Natural Gas and the Integration Process” (2014) 52 (4) JCMS 758. 
11
 See C. Damro, “Market Power Europe: EU Externalisation of Market-Related Policies” MERCURY 
E-paper No 5, October 2010. Available at http://mercury.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/E-
paper_no5_r2010.pdf [Accessed October 19, 2015] 
12
 See for a detailed analysis of CSDP: T. Dyson and T. Konstadinides, European Defence Co-
operation in EU Law & IR Theory. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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States and third countries vis-à-vis the security of EU’s energy supplies. Indeed, the 
externalisation of internal market policies has often been described as the EU’s most 
successful external action, premised on a core feature of the EU’s identity – the 
prevalence of its market order.13 
 
Whilst energy securitisation has boosted the EU's ability to develop a coherent 
external policy and become a global energy player,14 it has been noted in the past that 
‘the Member States remain divided by different economic and geopolitical interests 
and the EU has not yet been given enough competences to implement such a double-
standard approach.’15 The following sub-section explores whether things are different 
now that the EU has obtained an express energy competence in the Treaty. It also 
discusses whether its energy competence extends to energy security and, therefore, 
provides the EU with a robust presence in the policy field. 
 
Energy security as a new EU external policy 
 
It is important to ascertain where the EU's legal authority lies in energy security as 
placed in the terrain of EU external competence. EU external competence in the field 
of energy security, or the lack of it, constitutes a major stumbling block for the EU’s 
development and external profile-building in energy matters. This is the case despite 
the fact that the EU’s action at the international level is augmented by the Treaty in 
the form of express provisions regarding its legal personality (Article 47 TEU), the 
capacity to negotiate agreements with third countries or international organisations 
(Article 218 TFEU) and the possibility to pursue common policies and actions to 
safeguard EU values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity 
(Article 21 (a) TEU).  As such, the EU may only employ its implied powers under 
                                                 
13
 C. Carta and J-F. Morin, EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis: Making Sense 
of Diversity (London: Ashgate, 2014), p. 218 onwards. 
14
 See the Commission's 2015 energy strategy which aims to reduce dependence on Russia to a 
minimum. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-security-strategy  
[Accessed October 19, 2015] 
15
 R. Metais, “Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and a Geopolitical 
Approach”, College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 03/2013, p.23. 
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Article 216 (1) TFEU in order to conclude international agreements in the field of 
energy. This provision provides that: 
  
[t]he Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the 
Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect 
common rules or alter their scope. 
  
Article 216 (1) TFEU therefore establishes that EU competence may emerge not only 
from an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow implicitly from other 
provisions of the Treaty (such as Article 194 TFEU in the context of energy) and from 
measures adopted within the framework of those provisions by EU Institutions.16 
What is more, the CJEU has accepted that whenever EU law creates, for EU 
Institutions, powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific 
objective, the EU has authority to undertake international commitments necessary for 
the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express provision to that 
effect. Hence, post-Lisbon, international agreements on energy security are based 
either on the objectives or on a decision adopted within the area of the energy 
provisions of the Treaty. This is because, as explained, despite the external character 
of energy policies, there is no express external competence for the EU to act in the 
field. Implied powers under Article 216 (1) TFEU may therefore be of use to the 
Council in this new field.  
 
This section charted the journey from the early days of the EU to the present day. 
Since its inception in the form of Coal and Steel Community and Euratom, the EU has 
pushed for the establishment of a pan-European energy market. This endeavour 
became more manifest following the establishment of the European Community 
which promoted peripherally its internal market model in the field of energy through 
                                                 
16
 See for an analysis of EU implied powers in the external field and their codification in Article 216 
(1) TFEU: T. Konstadinides, “EU Foreign Policy under the Doctrine of Implied Powers: Codification 
Drawbacks and Constitutional Limitations” (2014) 39 (4) European Law Review 511. 
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inter alia Environmental and Competition legal instruments. In recent years, whilst 
keeping loyal to the maintenance of a functional internal energy market, the EU has 
become more ambitious especially with regard to ensuring security of supply and 
producing as well as the production and use of sustainable energy.  
 
The current state of play in EU competence is capable of promoting the EU’s post-
Lisbon energy agenda on energy security and sustainable energy. Current Article 194 
TFEU provides for a direct harmonised approach in energy policy where Member 
States seem to be transferring more control to the EU. At the same time, the Treaty 
also caters for a uniform approach vis-à-vis the security of energy supply. Article 122 
TFEU provides a textual guarantee to Member States that – in a spirit of solidarity - 
they would receive assistance in case their energy supplies are cut off (in the 
occurrence of a similar scenario to the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute).17 
Both Articles 194 and 122 TFEU can also be utilised as leges speciales to promote 
energy efficiency and sustainable / renewable energy. The above competences of the 
EU are also significant to the conduct of EU external energy policy, especially EU’s 
reliance on Russian energy the implications of which have significant ramifications 
for European security.  
 
Energy security and EU leverage over Russia’s economy and foreign policy 
 
While the development of the EU’s competence in energy security has been an 
incremental affair, the Ukraine-Russia conflict forms a critical juncture in EU energy 
security that highlights the urgent need to enhance and enforce the EU’s competence 
in energy security.18 The 2006 and 2009 Ukraine-Russia gas disputes, which led to the 
reduction of gas supply to several EU member states, provided a first warning of the 
potentially negative implications of EU dependence of Russian gas. However, the 
impact of energy security concerns on the EU’s response to the Ukraine-Russia 
                                                 
17
 See on the 2009 dispute between Russia and Ukraine described as an ‘emergency’: P.D. Cameron, 
“The EU and Energy Security: a Critical Review of the Legal Issues” in A. Antoniadis et al, The 
European Union and Global Emergencies: A Law and Policy Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011). pp.130-134. 
18
 See for recent proposals on how can the EU reduce its dependency on Russian gas: R. Leal Arcas et 
al, “The European Union and its Energy Security Challenges” (2015) 8 (4) Journal of World Energy 
Law ad Business 291. 
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conflict has starkly exposed the negative foreign policy implications of gas supply 
insecurity.  
 
Russia’s use of military force to annexe Crimea and its support for pro-Russian 
separatists in Eastern Ukraine highlights its nature as a revisionist power that also 
poses a threat to other post-Soviet states with large Russian minorities.19 The ability 
of sanctions to achieve change to the foreign policy calculus of states has received a 
significant degree of attention in the scholarly literature.20 However, the utility of 
military force in tackling Russian revisionism is limited, not least given Russia’s 
nuclear capabilities. Hence sanctions, despite their questionable effectiveness, offer 
the best coercive tool for the EU and NATO in their attempts to force change to 
Russian policy in post-Soviet space.  
 
To date, EU and US sanctions have focused on key individuals within the Russian 
business sector, military and foreign policy elite. Sanctions have also limited Russia’s 
access to capital markets and to technology for oil exploration and production and 
have banned arms exports to Russia.21 However, these sanctions lack the necessary 
severity to incentivise a change of course in Russia’s policy to Ukraine. Only 
sanctions which target Russia’s energy sector, especially its oil exports, which 
comprise around half of the revenue of the Russian state, will be sufficiently coercive 
to force change in Russian foreign policy. Europe is well-placed to apply such 
sanctions as in 2013 80 percent of Russian oil exports went to European countries.22 
 
However, Europe has displayed little willingness to consider sanctions against 
Russia’s oil exports. This is not due to fears about an oil crisis, as the EU would be 
                                                 
19
 W. Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers", Foreign Affairs 
May/June, 2014. 
20
 See, for detail: B. Early, Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2015); D. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
21
  See for current EU sanctions against Russia: N. Kushner, ‘Sanctions and Export Controls Update’ 
(2015) 129 Compliance Office Bulletin 1. See also ‘Ukraine crisis: Russia and sanctions’, BBC News, 
19 December 2014. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26672800 [Accessed October 
19, 2015]. 
22
 S. Six, “Russia’s Oil Export Strategy: Two Markets, Two Faces”, CIEP Paper, 2015, p.15, available 
at http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/publications/publication/russias-oil-export-strategy-two-
markets-two-faces [Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
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able to compensate for loss in Russian oil through tanker deliveries.23 Instead it is a 
consequence of the difficulties that Europe faces in diversifying its gas imports.24  
The UK and France import a limited quantity of Russian gas, however Germany and a 
number of CEE states exhibit a high-level of dependence on Gazprom.25 Germany 
imports 36 per cent of its gas imports from Russia and its energy companies have 
benefitted from a privileged relationship with Gazprom, having negotiated favourable 
energy prices when compared with CEE states.26 However, affordability has come at 
the expense of Europe’s supply security, highlighted most notably by the construction 
of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in 2005 that bypasses CEE states by transporting gas 
directly to Germany.27 
 
Divergence in dependence on Russian gas imports has had a significant effect on the 
willingness of Britain, France and Germany to enact sanctions on Russia’s energy 
sector. Britain has been keen to limit the effects of sanctions on the City of London.28 
Hence during sanction negotiations in 2014 Britain sought tougher sanctions against 
oil and gas imports and arms exports. 29  France, with an eye on maintaining its 
                                                 
23
 Interview 1, Section A2, cooperation in the IEA and bilateral energy cooperation with non-OCED 
states, Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Berlin, 13 August 2014. 
24
 For further detail on deficits in EU gas supply security see the following section. 
25
 In 2013 Russia exported 178.6 billion cubic meters (Bcm) of natural gas to Europe. 8.6 Bcm went to 
France; 41 Bcm to Germany and 16.6 Bcm to the UK. For information on the dependence of CEE 
states on Russian gas see R. Dickel et al, “Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas”, OEIS 
Paper, NG92, October 2014, p.3. 
26
 R. Fuchs, “Germany’s Russian energy dilemma”, Deutsche Welle, 29 March 2014, available at 
http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-russian-energy-dilemma/a-17529685 [Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
27
 “Duda slams Russia’s second Baltic gas pipeline to Germany”, Euractiv 09 September 2015, 
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/polish-president-slams-russias-second-baltic-gas-pipeline-
germany-317457> [Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
28
 A. Monaghan and J. Rankin, J. “EU and US sanctions against Russia: who will they hurt more?”, 30 
July 2014, Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/30/eu-us-sanctions-
against-russia-hurt; N. Watt, “UK seeking to ensure Russia sanctions do not harm City of London”, 
Guardian, 3 March 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/03/uk-seeks-russia-
harm-city-london-document; “Russia’s trade ties with Europe”, BBC News, 4 March 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26436291; “Europe’s dependency on Russian gas may be cut 
by energy efficiency focus”, Guardian, 9 September 2014, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/09/europe-dependency-russian-gas-energy-efficiency-eu 
[All accessed 19 October 2015]. 
29
 R. Mason and P. Wintour, “UK to press European allies for tougher sanctions over MH17”, 
Guardian, 21 July 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/21/uk-europe-
tougher-sanctions-russia-mh17-putin; S. Wagstyl, “Merkel’s harder stance on Russia fuels anxiety for 
companies”, Financial Times, 3 July 2014, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fa025df4-02b4-
11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html#axzz36mDPA3q7 [Both accessed October 19, 2015]. 
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lucrative arms exports to Russia, has attempted to limit sanctions to financial sector.30 
Germany, the most exposed of the West European countries to Russian gas imports, 
has displayed the greatest reticence to apply sanctions against the Russian energy 
sector.31 In sanction negotiations Germany has been eager to ensure that sanctions 
would not harm the Russian energy sector and has attempted to limit sanctions to the 
financial sector.32 However, given Russia’s contravention of the Minsk agreements 
and its willingness to use military force to seize territory, European states must be 
prepared to apply more far-reaching sanctions against the Russian oil and gas sectors. 
It is, therefore, imperative that Europe tackles its deficits in gas supply security.  
 
The EU’s energy security initiatives following the Ukraine-Russia crisis 
 
Before and following the 2006/09 gas crises the European Commission has been 
vocal in its warnings about the dangers associated with the dependence of European 
states on Russian gas. The EU has undertaken several initiatives which have sought to 
enhance Europe’s energy security in short-term gas supply crises. These initiatives 
include the abovementioned Directive 2004/67 (as replaced by Regulation 994/2010) 
that included the establishment of the Gas Coordination Group to foster a better 
information exchange information between member states, the Commission, industry 
and consumers.33  
 
The 2008 Commission Communication ‘Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU 
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan’ outlined, amongst a range of other 
                                                 
30
 S. Wagstyl, “Merkel’s harder stance on Russia fuels anxiety for companies” FT, 3 July 2014, 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fa025df4-02b4-11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html#axzz3p3c9Bcsy 
[Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
31
 While the agreement of more recalcitrant European states such as Greece will be important in 
ensuring a coordinated EU approach to sanctions, the leadership of Britain, France and Germany will 
be essential in securing EU consensus.  C. Oliver, “EU fails to agree new Russia sanctions”, FT, 29 
January 2015, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e95231f6-a7ae-11e4-8e78-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3TDkZipb6 [Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
32
 B. Benoit and A. Thomas, “Germany’s Merkel walks fine line in Russia standoff”, Wall Street 
Journal, 3 March 2014, available at 
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measures, the need to diversify Europe’s gas supplies through the Mediterranean and 
Southern Corridor.34 Finally, the Third Energy Package of 2009 also attempted to 
enhance Europe’s energy efficiency and self-sufficiency by pushing ahead with the 
internal energy market.35 Yet, EU member states have been slow to implement these 
directives and policy recommendations and as a consequence the EU was largely 
unprepared for the energy security implications of the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Several 
major problems persist in EU energy policy which act to exacerbate dependence on 
Russian gas and weaken the EU’s ability to challenge Russian revisionism.  
 
First, the energy relations of European states with third parties remain highly 
fragmented, with individual member states negotiating separate deals with Gazprom 
and other energy suppliers. This not only increases the cost of gas for smaller 
European states, but also endows Gazprom with the ability to use the promise of 
lower gas prices to divide European states. Moreover, as outlined in the introduction, 
the EU has been slow to diversify its external gas suppliers, with Russia remaining the 
dominant source. The South Stream project – that would have supplied Europe with 
63bn cubic meters of Russian natural gas per year – was cancelled by Russia in 
December 2014 in the face of opposition from the EU Commission that found the 
project in contravention of EU rules on the unbundling of gas supply and transport.36 
However, EU states have, on the whole, been very slow to act on the Commission’s 
long-standing warnings about the potential security risks associated with increased 
dependence on Russian supplies. In addition, the EU has also faced problems in 
developing the infrastructure that will allow the EU to take advantage of LNG and 
ensure that gas can be transferred between EU states in the event of a crisis. It also 
                                                 
34
 See, “Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan”, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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urgently needs to improve its solidarity mechanisms in gas crises, including the 
collective purchasing of gas.  
 
Furthermore, European states have made slow progress in developing the ‘hardware’ 
(electricity and gas transmission infrastructure) and the ‘software’ (the regulation) 
necessary to implement the internal energy market. This has led to the creation of 
separate national ‘energy islands’ which undermine energy efficiency, the roll-out of 
renewable energies and consequently reduce European energy self-sufficiency. 
Finally, for the internal energy market to work effectively Europe needs to improve 
its coordination in the decarbonizing of its economy and to ensure greater coherence 
between the environmental and security (both cost and supply security) dimensions of 
energy policy. For example, Germany whose Energiewende plans to achieve 30% of 
German gross energy consumption from renewables by 2020 and 60% by 2050, has 
made significant progress toward decarbonisation. However, other major EU states, 
such as France and the UK and are struggling to meet their commitment to the EU 
target of 20% renewables in the total primary energy supply (TPES).37  
 
Attaining greater energy self-sufficiency through renewable energy can only be 
achieved with more coordinated action to promote decarbonisation and energy 
efficiency. A more credible far-reaching European commitment to renewables would 
help create the political will necessary for the integration of energy markets and the 
development of electricity transmission networks. Two major EU energy initiatives 
since the onset of the Ukraine-Russia crisis have sought to address some of these 
outstanding issues, with mixed results.   
 
The Energy Security Strategy 
 
The first of these initiatives is the May 2014 Energy Security Strategy. The Energy 
Security Strategy proposed two measures to strengthen security of energy supply 
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http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/16/uk-misses-eus-interim-renewables-target 
[Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
Accepted copy: (2016) 41 (4) European Law Review 535-556 
 
 
 
overt the short-term (winter 2014/15), including enhancing cross-European 
coordination in crises and improving European gas infrastructure to facilitate the 
cross-border transfer of gas. The Energy Security Strategy also contains six proposals 
aimed at ensuring that Europe is in a stronger position to curb its dependence on 
Russian gas imports over the long-term.  
 
First, the Energy Security Strategy outlines the need to moderate energy demand. It 
focuses on speeding up progress in meeting the EU energy efficiency target of 20% 
by 2020 by focusing on the implementation of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive 
and Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. The Energy Security Strategy also 
plans to ring-fence €27billion of the European Structural and Innovation Funds to 
encourage private sector investment in energy efficiency.38  
 
Second, the Energy Security Strategy focuses on the urgent need to complete the EU 
internal energy market in electricity and gas. While noting progress in regional 
integration in the electricity and gas markets of Northern Europe through initiatives 
such as Nordpool (involving the integration of the Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and 
Finnish electricity markets) and the Pentalateral Forum (involving Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), the Energy Security Strategy 
recognizes the need for similar progress in the Baltic States and states of South East 
Europe to establish critical infrastructure and hasten the development of gas hubs.39 
The Energy Security Strategy therefore identifies 27 short and medium term priority 
projects of common interest (PCI) in gas infrastructure which build upon the 
interconnector and LNG terminal projects outlined in the EU’s ‘third package’ of 
legislative proposals for electricity and gas markets.40 The Energy Security Strategy 
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Energy Security”, Brussels, 28 May 2015, p.7. available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-security-strategy [Accessed October 19, 
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also initiates six PCI interconnector projects in electricity infrastructure41 focusing on 
the Baltic States, central and southern Europe and Iberia.42  
 
Third, the Energy Security Strategy points to the need to increase energy production 
within the EU, in particular through increasing the proportion of renewable energy in 
the EU TPES from 14.1% in 2012 to 27% by 2030.43  The Energy Security Strategy 
also gives a hesitant green light to the use of controversial technologies, such as the 
extraction of shale gas, to help to offset the decline of Europe’s conventional gas 
reserves in the North Sea.44 
 
Fourth, the Energy Security Strategy highlights the necessity for greater support for 
new energy technologies to improve energy efficiency, enhance energy storage 
capacity and help to manage gas and electricity grids, arguing that that research in 
these fields should be prioritized in the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation. 45  Fifth, the Energy Security Strategy stresses the 
importance of diversifying external gas supplies, especially through a focus on 
improving supply infrastructure with Norway, the states of the Caspian Sea Basin and 
exploring the possibility for taking advantage of the increasing global market in 
LNG.46  
 
Finally, the Energy Security Strategy calls for greater coordination between EU 
member states in external energy policy. In particular it notes the importance of 
taking advantage of Decision no 994/2012/EU that established an information 
exchange mechanism for intergovernmental agreements between EU members and 
third states in energy and the consequent potential provided by the Decision to 
involve the Commission in negotiation processes. The Energy Security Strategy also 
outlines plans to investigate the possibility of developing a procedure similar to the 
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EURATOM Supply Agency’s ‘collective purchasing mechanism’ that would allow 
the Commission to object to any contracts with third parties which may have 
especially negative implications for security of gas supply.47  
 
The Energy Union 
 
The Energy Security Strategy was followed by the Energy Union initiative that was 
first proposed by the former Polish President, Donald Tusk, in April 2014. Tusk 
proposed that six principles should stand at the heart of the Energy Union: the joint 
negotiation of gas contracts with Russia; strengthening solidarity between EU states 
in the event of gas crisis; increasing the level of EU co-financing of storage gas 
capacity and interconnectors to 75%; focusing on the ability of fossil fuels to help 
diversify Europe’s energy supply; signing joint agreements with key global gas 
exporters in LNG such as the US and Australia and finally, strengthening the Energy 
Community.48 
 
Two of the above proposals proved controversial with other EU member states, 
especially Germany. The Polish proposal for collective EU bargaining with Russia 
met with resistance from Germany due to its potential to contravene EU competition 
law and the difficulties that Germany would face in forcing companies, in a 
liberalised energy market, to form a consortium. The comparatively low prices that 
German companies pay for Russian gas in comparison with CEE states has also 
played an important role in reducing the incentive to pursue collective bargaining 
with Gazprom and to explore the diversification of pipeline supplies.49  Furthermore, 
the Polish proposal that Europe should begin to explore the potential of coal and 
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 Ibid, pp.17-19. 
48
 D. Tusk, “A united Europe can end Russia’s energy stranglehold”, FT, 21 April 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3jv3NC5dT 
[Accessed October 19, 2015]. The Energy Community is an international organisation that was 
established in 2005. It includes the EU and countries from the Black Sea region and South-East Europe 
and is tasked with extending the EU internal energy market to these states. 
49
 Stefan Meister, ‘Energy Union: the view from Berlin’, European Council on Foreign Relations 
available from http://www.ecfr.eu/blog/entry/energy_union_the_view_from_berlin [Accessed October 
21 2015]. 
Accepted copy: (2016) 41 (4) European Law Review 535-556 
 
 
 
fracking was anathema to German policy-makers given their commitment to the 
Energiewende.   
 
Hence, the Commission’s Energy Union Package of February 2015 waters down 
these two contentious proposals. Instead, the Package undertakes a number of 
measures which build upon the Energy Security Strategy by establishing – in a more 
explicit and detailed manner – a greater level of coherence between all dimensions of 
EU energy policy with ramifications for energy security. The Energy Union provides 
greater detail on how the EU plans to make progress in four key areas: diversifying 
supply and promoting greater European solidarity in negotiations with third parties; 
creating a fully integrated European energy market; moderating demand through 
energy efficiency and decarbonizing the economy and finally, improving research, 
innovation and competitiveness in energy.  
 
First, the Energy Union Package highlights the need to diversify gas supply through 
increased LNG imports and imports through the Southern corridor, the Mediterranean 
and Algeria. The package notes the importance of including energy-related provisions 
in trade agreements with key potential energy suppliers in Europe’s neighbourhood. It 
also emphasizes the importance of a stronger role for the Energy Community, in 
particular, enhancing the integration of the EU and Energy Community states by 
incentivizing energy market reforms and ensuring the implementation of the EU’s 
energy, environment and competition acquis.50  These goals will be outlined in a 
proposed resilience and diversification package in 2015-16 that will revise the 
existing security of gas supply regulation, alongside a comprehensive strategy for 
LNG and its storage. The Energy Union also includes measures to enhance the crisis-
management ability of the EU in the event of a gas supply crisis, including a 
commitment to develop emergency plans which will include Energy Community 
members to create options for the collective purchasing of gas by member states 
where they are dependent on a single supplier (subject to compliance with WTO and 
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EU competition rules) as part of a revision of the Security of Gas Supply 
Regulation.51 
 
In addition, the Energy Union develops proposals to strengthen the EU’s ability to act 
more harmoniously in negotiations with third countries. It outlines, in particular, the 
need to strengthen the role of the Commission in intergovernmental agreements and 
commercial agreements in order to ensure that such agreements are in compliance 
with EU Law. Hence the package outlines the intention of the Commission to review 
the 2012 Intergovernmental Agreements Decision (994/2012/EU) that established an 
information exchange mechanism with respect to agreements between member states 
and third countries in energy. This review will focus on ensuring that the Commission 
has the power to ensure agreements are compatible with EU legislation before 
negotiations are concluded; on securing the involvement of the Commission in such 
negotiations; on developing standard clauses specifying EU rules and on increasing 
the transparency of commercial gas supply contracts.52    
 
Second, in order to help promote the use of renewable energies and develop the 
‘hardware’ for the internal energy market, the Package proposes that a minimum 
interconnection target of 10% in electricity interconnection between member states be 
achieved by 2020, rising to 15% by 2030. Private sector investment is to be 
encouraged by funding from the European Investment Bank, Connecting Europe 
Facility, European Structural and Investment Funds and European Fund for Strategic 
Investments.53  
 
The Energy Union also provides further detail on its plans to ensure that the 
‘software’ of the internal energy market is in place through the strict enforcement of 
the 3rd Internal Energy Market Package, especially in the fields of the independence 
of regulators and the unbundling of energy supply and distribution networks. It 
outlines the importance of using instruments such as antitrust enforcement to end 
territorial restrictions in supply contracts and the enforcement of competition law to 
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regulate the evolution and formation of energy prices. In addition, the Energy Union 
plans to push for the enhancement of the powers of the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) that was established in 2010 by the 3rd Internal Energy 
Market Package. It is intended that these new powers will provide the ACER with the 
powers necessary to oversee the development of the market rules necessary for the 
completion of the internal energy market. These reforms to ACER will be delivered 
as part of a review of the regulatory framework of the 3rd Internal Energy Market 
Package, including a review of the role of the European Networks of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity and Gas (ENTSO-E/G).54  
 
The Energy Union also outlines the intention of the Commission to more strictly 
enforce mechanisms such as the Environmental and State Aid Guidelines which were 
adopted in April 2014. 55  These rules on state-aid are designed to redress the 
distortions of the internal energy market which result from national subsidies for 
renewable energy, including the introduction of a competitive bidding process for 
state support in order to gradually expose renewables to the energy market.56  In 
addition, the Energy Union emphasizes the intention of the Commission to use 
competition law to block the below-cost regulation of energy prices which can 
discourage both investment and the entrance of new companies to energy markets.57  
 
Third, the Energy Union includes a number of measures to promote energy efficiency 
in its review of the EU’s 2030 energy efficiency target of 30%, including enhancing 
energy efficiency in the buildings sector and decarbonizing the transport sector. These 
aims will be delivered through ensuring that initiatives promoting building energy 
efficiency are able to access financing more easily and developing a comprehensive 
road transport package dealing with infrastructure, new transport solutions and energy 
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efficiency. The Commission will also propose a new Renewable Energies Package in 
2016-17 including a focus on sustainable biomass and fuels.58   
 
Finally, the Energy Union includes proposals to enhance innovation, research and 
competitiveness in the EU energy sector, including, amongst other issues, promoting 
greater coordination and focus in research to maximize the efficiency of spending on 
research. Hence in 2015-16 the Commission plans to propose a European energy R&I 
approach that updates the Strategic Energy Technology Plan and strategic transport 
R&I agenda.   
 
Implementing the Energy Union: legal challenges 
 
Having identified the main challenges to enhancing energy security in the EU, this 
section will now turn to focus on the legal competence of the EU in three key areas 
which will are central to European energy security: promoting the use of renewables; 
completing the internal energy market and strengthening the EU’s position vis-à-vis 
external gas suppliers.  
 
Promoting the use of renewables 
 
At first glance, the lead role that the EU has played on efforts to tackle climate change 
suggest that optimism may be warranted about the potential for renewables to provide 
a partial solution to Europe’s dependence on Russian gas by increasing Europe’s 
energy self-sufficiency. However, while the Energy Union boldly claims that the ‘EU 
is already on track to achieve its 2020 target of 20% renewable energy in its energy 
mix’, the Commission’s 2015 renewables progress report highlights that a number of 
key EU states, including France, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, the UK, 
Belgium, Spain, Hungary and Poland will all face difficulties in meeting the 20% 
target.59 The Energy Union rightly includes measures to try to stimulate a greater use 
of renewables in the transport sector, where significant problems have occurred in 
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meeting the 2020 goal of 10% renewables in this sector. It also sets out plans to foster 
more coherent pan-European research and innovation in renewable energy60  
 
However, the upmost priority for the Commission must be to ensure that it enforces 
the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28) which sets national targets and 
measures for the use of energy from renewable sources to be achieved by 2020.61  
Unlike its now repealed predecessors (Directive 2001/77 on renewables and Directive 
2003/30 on biofuels), the language of the 2009 Directive is mandatory, not 
permissive. In particular, Article 4 obliges Member State to produce a renewable 
energy action plan setting national targets for the shares of energy from renewable 
sources in transport, electricity, heating and cooling. It also invites Member States to 
take measures in order to achieve those targets. Whether Member States will be apt to 
introduce pan-European measures effectively designed to ensure the share of energy 
from renewable sources depends, inter alia, on the powers and competences of the 
EU Institutions to enforce the Directive and how they can go about making more use 
of these powers.  
 
In theory, the Commission can immediately initiate infringement proceedings under 
the (direct actions) Article 258 TFEU procedure against non-compliant Member 
States for failure to properly implement the Directive. However, the Directive is using 
a softer tone vis-à-vis enforcement, not the least because it falls short of providing the 
Member States with a list of interim targets between now and 2020. For instance, 
Article 4(4) of the Directive stipulates that Member States with a renewable energy 
sources share below the trajectory set out in the Directive (Part B, Annex I) need to 
submit within two years an updated action plan to the Commission. Similarly, Article 
5(2) of the Directive provides that Member States must inform directly the 
Commission in case they are unable to meet their share of renewable energy targets as 
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a result of force majeure (overriding necessity).62 The European Commission will 
then adopt a decision on whether a Member State has demonstrated that this is the 
case indeed and, if appropriate, modify its renewable energy targets.  
 
The above alternative mechanisms raise serious legal questions as to whether absolute 
compliance with the Renewable Energy Directive is mandatory prior to the cut-off 
date of 2020. What is more, even if the Commission decides to litigate en masse 
against Member States prior to 2020 due to their failure to take effective measures for 
the use of energy from renewable sources, the lack of clarity in the Directive could 
provide an excuse for non-implementation. One could argue that Member States may 
even resort to the adoption of counter-measures against the EU by taking action 
against the EU Institutions under Article 263 TFEU due to an alleged violation of 
Article 7 TFEU by the EU legislature for failing to provide for consistency between 
EU energy policies and activities.63 
 
Another similar challenge for the EU is related to the enforcement of the more recent 
Energy Efficiency Directive which came into force in 2012 and establishes a set of 
binding measures to help the EU reach its 20% energy efficiency target by the 
abovementioned cut-off date of 2020.64 Again, the question shifts to the extent that 
the EU has powers to enforce this Directive although still three years down the line 
Member States are still to fully address its correct implementation. The Commission 
has so far taken action against numerous Member States for failure to transpose the 
Directive in a timely manner. 65  Forcing an Energy Union through infringement 
proceedings against Member States, however, confirms the Member States’ lack of 
engagement in the energy integration process and their sovereign preference for their 
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choice of resources. This is despite the political capital invested by the EU to address 
energy security and the salience of further convergence in the field.  
 
The Internal Dimension: Completing the internal energy market through competition 
law enforcement 
 
Additional to the energy legislative packages and initiatives discussed previously, the 
enforcement of EU competition law is vital for promoting a single energy market. If 
the EU is to successfully enhance its energy supply security, the Commission will 
need to enforce and enhance the ‘software’ of the internal market: its regulatory 
powers which will be central in ensuring the completion of the internal energy 
market. Yet, the Commission’s ability to enforce Competition Policy in the field of 
energy has appeared relatively weak, with a number of pending investigations against 
Member States for failing to implement the provisions of the so-called 3rd Energy 
Package which included, amongst other measures, new provisions on unbundling 
allowing Member States to choose between ownership unbundling or setting up an 
Independent System Operator or an Independent Transmission Operator.66   
 
Furthermore, apart from these ‘positive integration’ steps, the Commission has 
utilised its ‘negative integration’ power tools. More specifically, Article 102 TFEU 
has proved to be an important regulatory tool to promote a single energy market by 
prohibiting the abuse of dominant position of energy companies operating in the EU 
internal market for both gas importation and supply. There are ongoing investigations 
against energy companies based in the Member States such as the Bulgarian Energy 
Holding, Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz for preventing competitors’ access to key gas 
infrastructures in Bulgaria. 67  Such investigations prove that the Member States’ 
traditional opposition against ownership unbundling has been met with resistance 
from the part of the Commission. The Commission has instead adopted a regulatory 
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approach in order to end infringements and restore effective competition to the energy 
market.  
 
During this decade, the Commission appears to have resolved most energy disputes 
under Article 102 TFEU via resort to Article 9 (1) of Regulation 1/2003 which 
obliges undertakings to offer binding commitments in order to meet the 
Commission’s concerns. If an undertaking breaks such commitments, the 
Commission may impose a fine of up to 10% of the former’s worldwide turnover, 
without having to find an infringement of the EU competition rules. Such 
commitment proceedings, although different to formal infringement proceedings 
(which often result to litigation and the imposition of fines), have contributed to an 
extent to the liberalisation of the EU energy markets because they have induced more 
uniform behaviour on the part of energy companies operating in the EU.68   
 
Commitments in high-profile cases, most recently evident in the Google case, 69 
(Google had inter alia to notify website owners of the option to opt-out of display in 
Covered Web Pages of content crawled by the former’s search user agents) have often 
been associated with the procedural modernisation of EU Competition law and 
antitrust enforcement.70  Yet, in the last two years the Commission seems to have 
changed its enforcement tactics  – it has gradually ceased to use commitments as a 
means to tramp the practice of dominant undertakings and has reverted to formal 
infringement proceedings.71 This is perhaps because commitment proceedings take 
time (the Google case took about four years to resolve). Such cases also do not reach 
the CJEU and thus make no contribution to the formulation of legal precedent and 
provide no formal guidance on future abuses of dominant position. It is therefore 
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argued here that regulatory support needs to be coupled with strategic litigation in EU 
Courts in order to ensure the proper functioning of EU energy markets. 
 
In addition to commitment proceedings, and most importantly for the purpose of this 
article, the EU has enforced EU law more strictly against external suppliers vis-à-vis 
territorial restrictions in gas supply agreements and charging unfair prices. In this 
regard, the EU has, more recently, shown signs of beginning to flex its regulatory 
muscles against gas producers and suppliers like Gazprom, as demonstrated by its 
successful opposition to South Stream’s failure to unbundle gas supply and transport, 
as well as its pending anti-trust case against Gazprom opened in 2012 for alleged 
abuse of dominant position in eight EU Member States.  
 
In essence, the Commission has argued that Gazprom has prevented cross-border 
trade, in particular gas flow from EU CEE Member States to their counterparts and 
has imposed territorial restrictions inclusive of export bans and destination clauses. 
Likewise, Gazprom has also contributed to market separation by charging Member 
States excessive prices.72  This is a very important case and has received increasing 
attention following the Commission’s statement of objections to Gazprom on 22 April 
2015; the war in Ukraine, which erupted a year earlier; and the EU sanctions imposed 
against Russia.  
 
All in all, it appears that the Commission has taken an active stance using competition 
law enforcement to regulate the evolution and formation of energy prices. The law on 
abuse of dominance has also helped to stop instances of below-cost regulated energy 
prices which can discourage both investment and the entrance of new companies to 
energy markets. As previously outlined, for instance, the EU has proposed its 
intention to more strictly enforce and also to review the Environmental and State Aid 
Guidelines adopted in April 2014. These steps aim to simplify and target enforcement 
rules according to competition threat and impact on the single market posed by 
market fragmentation through national support measures.  
                                                 
72
 Commission (EU), “Commission sends Statement of Objections to Gazprom for alleged abuse of 
dominance on Central and Eastern European gas supply markets” (Press Release, 22 April 2015) 
(IP/15/4828). See also See A Riley, “Commission v. Gazprom: The antitrust clash of the decade?” 
CEPS 285 (31 October 2012). 
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The external dimension of the internal market: The EU’s position vis-à-vis external 
gas suppliers  
 
The export and import of energy products from and to third countries and falls within 
the scope of Common Commercial Policy. 73  In November 2010, the European 
Commission Communication provided that the EU must formalise agency from the 
part of the Member States when they conclude bilateral energy relations.74 It also 
established that the Commission should be charged with the role of aligning existing 
international agreements with internal market rules and enhancing cooperation 
between Member States for the conclusion of new ones. Additionally, the European 
Council of 4 February 2011, whilst being mindful of commercially sensitive 
information, invited all Member States to inform the Commission of all their bilateral 
energy agreements with third countries with a view to sharing them between them.  
 
As a follow-up, EU legislation induced a compliance check of long-term bilateral 
agreements with the internal market. Decision 994/2012/EU on compliance of 
Intergovernmental Agreements with EU law exclusively addressed the Member States 
and provided, inter alia, for a framework on exchange of information between the 
Commission and Member States (Article 3) and confidentiality (Article 7) vis-à-vis 
past bilateral arrangements on reselling clauses; pricing clauses to name but a few 
areas. Member States must also inform the Commission of such future 
Intergovernmental Agreements that may impact the internal market or security of gas 
supply. The Decision also set 2016 as a date for review (Article 8) in order to update 
the Decision with a view to ensuring that the EU speaks with one voice in 
negotiations with third countries over energy matters. 
                                                 
73
 See S. Haghighi, Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the EU with Major Oil and Gas 
Supplying Countries (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) p.112. 
74
 See also earlier attempts in 2008 Commission Communication “Energy Security and Solidarity 
Action Plan” available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0781; 
2009 Council Conclusions on “Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security and 
Solidarity Action Plan”, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/106196.pdf [Both accessed 
October 19, 2015]. 
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On the downside, the Decision leaves a wide margin for interpretation both in relation 
to the information that Member States should share with the Commission and the 
arrangements it considers to be compatible with the EU internal market. This legal 
uncertainty arising out of the text of the Decision does not immediately constitute a 
cause for concern for Member States because the Decision only has a programmatic / 
guidance value. Most importantly, the Decision does not provide for a robust 
enforcement mechanism in case a Member State does not aspire to the Commission’s 
‘open access’ policy.  
 
The EU legislature needs to take into account the abovementioned problem areas 
during the revision of the Decision so that first, it creates a clear set of obligations for 
information sharing from the part of the Member States rather than a mere open 
invitation to share based on good will and solidarity aspirations. It should also inform 
Member States as to what arrangements are compatible with EU interests, so as to be 
able to enforce its internal energy market rules through the Third Energy Package and 
Environmental and State Aid Guidelines. Last, the Decision needs to include a 
systematised enforcement mechanism in case of breaches of these obligations in order 
to achieve maximum legal / regulatory certainty and project it towards both EU-based 
and third country undertakings. 
 
The above sentiments aside, it is questionable whether a future upgrade to the 
Commission’s enforcement powers under the reviewed Decision may bring more 
security and solidarity in the EU external energy market. The current lack of 
enforcement seems more political than due to the poor powers of the Commission. 
For instance, it is unlikely that the Commission’s powers could be enhanced in the 
near future with respect to completing the internal market but also with respect to the 
proposed review of Decision 994/2012/EU given the position of Member States and 
the Eurosceptic European Parliament that recently voted down the Energy Security 
Strategy. 
 
But what powers could the Commission be given ideally? The Energy Security 
Strategy seems to suggest that the EURATOM Supply Agency ‘collective purchasing 
mechanism’ provides a legal precedent for efforts to enhance the ability of the 
Accepted copy: (2016) 41 (4) European Law Review 535-556 
 
 
 
Commission to object to or even lock agreements with third parties with negative 
implications for supply security. EURATOM Supply Agency’s ability to intervene in 
supply contracts between EU utilities and third country producers appears sound in 
order to reduce dependency on Russia. A good example of its intervention is the 
nuclear-fuel supply deal signed in 2014 between Hungary and Russia, where the 
Agency asked for modifications in the fuel-supply contract of two 1,000 megawatt 
units at the Paks nuclear power plant.75  
 
Yet, there are two stumbling blocks in the work of the Agency in limiting EU 
utilities’ dependency on larger amounts of Russian supplies. First, given its sour 
relationship with the EU, Russia is consistently dealing with Member States outside 
EU structures through the signing of bilateral agreements with them (the so-called 
Turkish Stream Project between Russia and Greece is one example 76 ). Second, 
Member States are eager to make up for lost energy production by relying on nuclear 
fuel from Russia by disregarding both EU competition rules (i.e. the potential of 
Gazprom to dominate both upstream gas supply and distribution) and the EU 
instructions to diversify their external energy supplies.  
 
The EU also faces legal challenges in the diversification of external energy supply. 
While diversification of suppliers is worthwhile, especially from states in the 
Southern Corridor, this will be a long-term solution to reducing Europe’s dependence 
on Russia gas and is associated with significant difficulties. 77 The ability of Europe to 
secure gas supplies from Central Asia has been restricted by disagreement over the 
                                                 
75
 The content of the intergovernmental agreement has not been made public. See ‘Russian-Hungarian 
Nuclear Agreement’, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 15.01.2014. Available at: 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-01-15/russian-hungarian-nuclear-agreement 
[Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
76
 See “Greek energy minister unveils plan for €2bn gas deal with Russia”, FT 09 July 2015, available 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3e2221e-2639-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca.html [Accessed October 19, 
2015]. 
77
 Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth largest gas supplies, ‘Energy Union Package’, European 
Commission, Brussels, February 25, 2015, p.4. 
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legal status of the Caspian Sea and problems attaining agreement from Turkmenistan 
which has focused on exports to China and Russia.78   
 
The ongoing Trans-Adriatic (due for completion in 2019) and Trans-Anatolian 
pipeline projects (set for completion in 2018), will supply Europe with 16bn and 10bn 
cubic meters of gas annually respectively.79 Yet the cancellation of South Stream, 
which would have supplied Europe with 63bn cubic meters of Russia gas annually, 
delivers an opportunity to attain private sector investment for the Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline (TCP) which will import gas from Turkmenistan.  
 
The imperative of increasing gas imports from the Caspian Sea region is magnified by 
the uncertainties of gas supplies from North Africa, Iran and Iraq due to instability 
and conflict in the MENA region, while Eastern Mediterranean reserves are only 
capable of supplying 10bn cubic meters of gas to the EU on a yearly basis. 80 
Furthermore, Turkmenistan has become more receptive to diversifying its gas exports 
in recent months after Russia reduced its consumption of Turkmen gas exports.81  
 
As Dickel et al note, the EU must now focus on helping to settle the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea, or at a minimum attain agreement from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
that this will not be an obstacle to a TCP.82 The EU Commission Vice-President, 
Maros Sefovic has been making concerted diplomatic efforts to gain the support of 
                                                 
78Interview 1, Section A2, cooperation in the IEA and bilateral energy cooperation with non-OCED 
states, Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Berlin, 13 August 2014. ; R. Dickel et al “Reducing 
European dependence”, p.25.  
79
 F. Dohmen and A. Jung, “Cold turkey: How Germany could end Russian gas dependency”, Spiegel 
Online 06 May 2014, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/german-alternatives-to-
russian-gas-numerous-but-pricey-a-967682.html; R. Dickel et al, “Reducing European dependence: 
Distingushing natural gas security from geopolitics”, OIES Paper, October 2014, pp.24-25. 
80Ibid, R. Dickel et al, “Reducing European dependence”, pp.17-29; A. Nelsen, “Israel sees ‘stars 
aligned’ for new gas pipeline to Europe”, Guardian, 1 December 2014, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/01/israel-sees-stars-aligned-for-new-gas-pipeline-to-
europe [Accessed October 19, 2015]. 
81
 C. Oliver, “EU courts Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan as links with Russia sour” FT, 25 February 
2015, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f73e0e3c-bc05-11e4-a6d7-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3pCjUTv2t  [Accessed October 21, 2015]. 
82
 R. Dickel et al, “Reducing European dependence”, p.25. 
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Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for a TCP. 83  However, attaining agreement from 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan will be a difficult process due to their disputes over the 
distribution of Caspian Sea energy resources.84  
 
It is worth-noting that the legal status of the Caspian Sea vis-à-vis territorial 
ownership and navigational rights goes back in time to the St. Petersburg Treaty 
(1723), the Resht Treaty (1732) and the Treaty on Peace and Friendship (1921) where 
usage of the Caspian Sea was shared between the USSR and Persia (now 
Iran).  Following the collapse of the USSR, new post-Soviet sovereign states–subjects 
to international law emerged (Russia; Azerbaijan; Kazakhstan; Turkmenistan). As 
such, the legal quest for an internationally accepted status, inclusive of multinational 
ownership of the Caspian Sea became subject to hard negotiation with the aim to sign 
a Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea.  
 
Despite the signature of bilateral agreements and protocols (e.g. between Russia and 
Kazakhstan in 1998 and 2002 respectively on the delimitation of the Northern part of 
the Caspian Sea for subsoil use; and the aforementioned countries and Azerbaijan in 
2003) the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea and division into 
sectors as well as definition of common spheres of joint activity (such as oil and gas 
rights; pipeline routes) remains a work progress.85 It may therefore be that the launch 
of a TCP requires more concerted diplomatic leadership from Europe’s political 
heavyweights – notably from Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel – not least 
given the important potential role that Germany energy companies could play in the 
TCP.  
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 C. Oliver, “EU courts Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan as links with Russia sour” FT, 25 February 
2015, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f73e0e3c-bc05-11e4-a6d7-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3pCjUTv2t  [Accessed October 21, 2015]. 
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 O. Coblani, “Central Asian gas in Eurasian power game” (2014) 68 Energy Policy 351. 
85
 See for more detail on the background issues related to the legal status of the Caspian Sea S. 
Yinogradov and P. Wouters, “The Caspian Sea: Quest for a New Legal Regime” (1996) 9 (1) Leiden 
Journal o/International Law 87. 
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Conclusions: The Way Forward – Energy Security and the European Global 
Strategy 
 
In June 2015 the European Council launched the development of the EU Global 
Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy to replace the 2003 European Security 
Strategy. The Global Strategy forms an opportunity for European states to ensure 
security of energy supply and thereby enhance autonomy in foreign and security 
policy decision-making by mitigating their dependence on foreign powers, especially 
Russia.86 Two issues are of particular importance. First, the Global Strategy should 
focus on strengthening the EU’s ability to undertake multilateral engagement with 
external energy partners.87 Second, as Youngs argues, the EU Global Strategy must 
also ‘…spell out how it will tackle the more problematic linkages between internal 
and external EU policy dynamics’ in the realisation of a truly common foreign and 
security policy. This imperative is especially relevant in the sphere of European 
energy security where the failure of European states to develop the internal energy 
market has very important knock-on effects for the dependence of European states on 
Russia.  
 
International relations theory provides useful insights about the potential of the 
Energy Union and Global Strategy to support the development of the internal and 
external dimensions of the single energy market.  Energy security sits uncomfortably 
at the nexus of ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics.88  On the one hand, security of supply 
remains a vital national interest that has important implications for a state’s relative 
power in the international system. Hence the actions of states in energy security can 
be understood through more traditional geopolitical analytical frameworks, such as 
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 S. Biscop, “Global and Operational: A New Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy” Instituto 
Affari Internazionale Working Paper 15, 27, July 2015, 6-9. 
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 R. Youngs and S. Far, “Energy Union and EU Global Strategy”, Carnegie Europe 2 December 2015, 
<http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/12/02/energy-union-and-eu-global-strategy/imjs> [Accessed December 
08 2015]. 
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 Hoffmann distinguishes between ‘high politics’ that concerns issues threaten the existence of the 
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Neorealism.89 Yet, on the other hand, security of cost has been pursued by liberalising 
energy markets and distancing the state from energy policy formulation and 
implementation. European energy policy has, therefore, become a poorly-steered 
system of ‘multi-level governance’ where important competences in security of cost 
(which also have implications for supply security) have been transferred ‘vertically’ 
to the supranational level and ‘horizontally’ to the private sector, while significant 
competence also remains at the national level.90  
 
European states have much to gain from the emergence of ‘governance’ in energy 
policy, especially from the ‘vertical’ diffusion of policy agenda-setting and 
implementation powers. The growth of EU competence in energy policy provides an 
important opportunity for stronger leadership to promote collective European action 
that will help ensure greater security of supply, reduce energy costs and tackle climate 
change. However, the ability of European states to maximize the gains from this 
collective action is undermined by the diverse economic and political interests which 
foster resistance to key initiatives in the Energy Union, despite their clear long-term 
benefits.  
 
Germany provides an excellent example study of the political hurdles that must be 
overcome if the Global Strategy is to result in measures that will strengthen the 
Commission’s competence in shaping relations with external energy suppliers.   
Following Russian support for German reunification, Germany developed a high-
level of dependence on Russian gas imports. This policy was underpinned by a 
‘civilian-power’ 91  led foreign policy framework under the administration of 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (1998-2005) which emphasised the ability of Germany 
to achieve political and social change with Russia through economic partnership. 
                                                 
89
 Neorealism argues that the behaviour of states is governed by the presence of an anarchic 
international system. This predisposes states to be highly-sensitive to losses in relative power. Kenneth 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading MA: Addison Wesley, 1979). 
90
 On multi-level governance, see G. Marks et al, “European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric 
vs Multi-level Governance” (1996) 34 (3) Journal of Common Market Studies 341.  
91
 The civilian power model is based upon respect for law, social justice, sustainable development, and 
non-violent conflict resolution. It involves acceptance of the need for of international cooperation to 
achieve foreign policy objectives; non-military, mainly economic policy tools and willingness to use 
international institutions to address critical policy issues. H. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New 
Civilian Powers” (1990/91) 69 (5) Foreign Affairs, 91-106; 
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Although proponents of ‘change through interdependence’ within the German core 
executive have now been side-lined in favour of a more sceptical view of Russia 
intentions, rapprochement with Russia has established deeply-embedded material 
path dependencies. 92 In particular, the cheap gas prices negotiated with Gazprom 
combined with the benefits to the German energy industry of retaining its position as 
a key gas distribution hub have left Germany reticent to face up to the security 
implications of dependence on Russian gas.  
 
Germany’s dependence on Russian gas has been compounded by poor planning in 
Germany’s transition to renewable energies. Launched in 2010, the Energiewende 
(energy transition) plans to achieve 30 per cent of German gross energy consumption 
from renewables by 2020 and 60 per cent by 2050. 93  However, the technical 
challenges of the Energiewende and the 2011 decision to phase-out nuclear power, 
which constituted 22 per cent of German electricity production in 2011, has left 
Germany struggling to meet these ambitions targets. Consequently, as the IEA notes 
in its 2013 report on Germany, it likely to be more dependent on gas imports in the 
coming years when offsetting fluctuations in solar and wind electricity generation.94 
Hence rather than diversify supply and promoting greater solidarity with CEE states, 
in June 2015 Germany agreed to develop a second Baltic gas pipeline bypassing 
Ukraine and Poland. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will deliver 55Bcm of gas per year 
to Western Europe and strengthen Germany’s position as a gas distribution hub.95  
 
The negative impact of national economic and political interests in crafting a common 
European positions on the external dimensions of the single energy market are 
compounded by the slowdown of the integrative process in the context of the rise of 
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Euroscepticism in both established and new EU members.96 This public opposition to 
EU integration – manifested for example in the European Parliament’s voting down 
of the Energy Security Strategy – makes it unlikely that the Commission will be able 
to attain many of new powers that the Energy Union envisages.97 It will be especially 
difficult to gain greater competence in negotiations with external energy suppliers due 
to the sensitivities of states – and the European public – to the delegation of further 
decision-making powers in such foreign policy areas of ‘high politics’. However, the 
completion of the internal energy market and promotion of renewables falls further 
into the area of ‘low politics’ and therefore offers greater possibilities for action by 
the High Representative and Commission. 
 
Faced with these economic and political ‘realities on the ground’ at the national level, 
it is unlikely that the EU Global Strategy will be able to deliver detail and coherence 
in support of the external dimensions of the Energy Union without the presence of 
significant crisis (such as a further escalation of Russian aggression in Eastern 
Europe). Yet, the High Representative and Commission have not yet recognised the 
implications of the rise of Euroscepticism. As Youngs highlights, the Global Strategy 
review paper released in summer 2015 ‘…rather breezily suggests that the crisis [in 
integration] is likely to prompt further integration and thus provide a positive 
opportunity for foreign policy’.98 If the Energy Union is to lead to more substantial 
powers for the Commission and High Representative to enforce the internal and 
external dimensions of the single energy market, two key areas of activity will be 
necessary. 
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First, the Commission must focus on undertaking more effective public diplomacy 
that sheds light on the need to complete the single energy market. ‘Input legitimacy’ 
forms a very important tool used by political leaders at the national level to justify the 
pursuit of short-term economic interests, such as protecting national energy industries 
from competition or ensuring low energy prices. 99 For the Commission to effectively 
assert a stronger role in shaping the internal and external dimensions of the single 
energy market it will need gain greater support amongst the EU public by enhancing 
EU citizens’ perception of the EU’s ‘output legitimacy’ in energy security. The raw 
material for compelling public diplomacy on behalf of the Energy Union and EU 
Global Strategy is present. The implementation of the Energy Union will bring lower 
prices for consumers and help keep Europe at the forefront of efforts to tackle climate 
change. It will also enhance the EU’s security by ensuring that European states are 
able to act in a unified manner and apply ‘hard power’ in the form of crippling 
sanctions against Russian energy exports.  
 
Second, engagement with policy makers across EU member states will be essential to 
ensure that the Global Strategy is a document that has buy-in at the national level and 
that it delivers the strategic guidance and institutional processes necessary to facilitate 
the implementation of the internal and external dimensions of the single energy 
market. Attaining consensus amongst EU member states for an overarching strategy 
of engagement with Europe’s energy suppliers as part of the EU Global Strategy will 
be problematic, for reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, the Global Strategy offers a 
good opportunity to enhance European commitment completing the internal 
dimensions of the single energy market.  
 
The emphasis of the Energy Union on tackling climate change, improving energy 
efficiency, cost and supply security provides an excellent basis for the Commission 
build support for its aims across the fields of economic, environmental and security 
energy policy at the national level. However, greater effort from the High 
Representative and Commission is required to establish support in these policy areas. 
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Indeed, the High Representative has attempted to instigate broader public engagement 
and consultation on the Global Strategy through high level-discussions conducted 
within the Brussels inner circle.100 While self-congratulatory discussions are good for 
morale they have achieved little to no progress. Instead, the EU needs to reformulate 
its strategy vis-à-vis energy interdependence between Russia and the EU. It has to 
acknowledge that despite alternative forms of energy supply, it will continue to rely 
greatly, although not exclusively, on Russian gas as a matter of medium-term 
necessity. Likewise, it is imperative that Russia appreciates the EU’s aspiration for 
diversification, market integration, and development of renewable energy as a matter 
of prosperity.  
 
While the mutual energy relations between the EU and Russia are here to stay, the 
EU’s capacity to contribute to external energy policies as a value actor is vital. The 
EU can indeed limit the harm caused by the current application of Russian strategy 
based on inter alia cutting of energy supplies and manipulating hub prices by 
ensuring that rule of law and common market principles are adhered to by Russia. 
This is because the EU has more leverage to change the mutual (but rather 
asymetrical) EU-Russia dependency in the long term. Indeed, Russia appears more 
dependent on the EU as a consumer than the EU is on Russia as a supplier. The EU 
could thus strengthen the rule of law on the EU-Russia energy partnership by 
gradually emboldening Russia’s adherence to the European energy trade regime.  
 
In parallel, Member States, especially Russia’s best European partners, would have to 
put self-interest behind (such as Russian subsidising gas prices) and make more use of 
the EU in a spirit of solidarity. Such a move would imply compromising their own 
sovereignty in voluntary ways and pushing daring regulatory proposals into the EU 
legislative process. Indeed, reducing regulatory uncertainty and enabling the EU to 
enforce its common legal instruments both internally and externally are within the 
EU’s purview. Concerted action at the EU level will not only enhance energy security 
in Europe but will further contribute to setting international energy regulatory 
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standards that when properly adhered to by Russia may restore its image as a reliable 
energy partner in the global market.101  
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 See K. Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), Chapter 8. 
